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Abstract—Power supply underpowering and negative power
supply glitches are commonly used for the purpose of injecting
faults into secure circuits. The related fault injection mechanism
has been extensively studied: it is based on setup time violations.
Positive power supply glitches are also used to inject faults.
However, an increase of the supply voltage is not consistent with
a mechanism based on setup time violation. Besides, no research
work has yet identified the corresponding mechanism. In this
work, we report the use of an embedded delay-meter to monitor
the core voltage of a programmable device exposed to power
supply glitches. It permitted us to gain a further insight into the
mechanism associated with power glitches and also to identify
the injection mechanism of positive power supply glitches.
I. INTRODUCTION
Secure circuits are targeted by a wide range of physical
attacks. Among these are fault attacks (FA) based on modifying
the circuit environment in order to change its behaviour or to
induce faults into its computations. Fault injection (FI) may be
performed thanks to several means: laser shots, overclocking,
underpowering, temperature increase, power supply glitches or
electromagnetic pulses. A fine understanding of the properties
and the mechanisms involved with these FI techniques is of
high interest to evaluate the related threats and also to facilitate
the design of counter-measures.
Laser FI has a specific mechanism that is well known.
Whereas FI based on setup time violations [1], [2] may be
obtained by various techniques: overclocking , underpowering
[1], temperature increase, clock and negative power supply
glitches, and to a certain extent EM pulses. The latter FI
techniques are linked to an increase of the target’s propagation
delays over its clock period (see section II).
Positive power supply glitches, despite being a practical
fault injection means [3], have been less studied. It can not be
explained by a setup time violation because a voltage increase
will lead to a decrease of the target’s propagation times, which
is inconsistent with this hypothesis. Its FI mechanism has not
yet been ascertained.
In this paper, we report the use of a digital delay-meter
embedded in a programmable device (FPGA) as presented in
[4] and [5] for the purpose of identifying the fault injection
mechanism related to positive power supply glitches. It al-
lowed us to monitor the core voltage of the device when
exposed to positive and negative power supply glitches. It
also made it possible to correlate the perturbations induced
on the target’s core voltage with the faults injected into an
implementation of the advanced encryption standard (AES [6]).
Our contributions to that research field are:
• An illustration of the use of a delay-meter to monitor the
core voltage of a circuit exposed to power supply glitches,
• An identification of the fault injection mechanism related
to positive power supply glitches,
• An in-depth experimental study of the practice of FI with
power supply glitches.
This article is organized as follows. In section II, a reminder
of timing constraints and an explanation of how faults may
be injected by their violation is provided. In section III, the
architecture and principles of the delay-meter used as an
on-chip voltmeter are described. The experimental setup is
described in section IV. The obtained experimental results are
presented and analyzed in section V. Finally, our findings are
summarized in section VI with some perspectives.
II. PRELIMINARIES
In this section the basics of timing constraints are summa-
rized. Then the mechanism of fault injection through timing
constraint violations is reviewed.
A. Timing constraints
Almost all digital ICs use a common clock signal to syn-
chronize their internal operations. Fig. 1 illustrates the cor-
responding architecture. Data are computed by combinatorial
logic (marked
∑
) surrounded upstream and downstream by
register banks made of D flip-flops (DFF) sharing the same
clock signal (clk).
n n
DpMax
n
Tclk skewT Tsetup+ −
data n
clk
D Q
DFF
D
D Q
DFF
clk2q
Fig. 1. Internal architecture of digital ICs.
On a clock rising edge, data are released from the upstream
DFF after a delay Dclk2q which represents the delay between
the clock rising edge and the actual update of a register’s
output. Then, these data are processed through the logic before
being latched into the next register on the next clock rising
edge. The data propagation time, Dp(data), through the logic
is not constant. It depends on the handled data (those of the
current and previous clock periods) and also on the power
supply voltage. DpMax is the longest propagation time (i.e.
the logic critical time).
A proper functioning of a DFF requires its input to be stable
all along a time window that extends before and after the clock
rising edge from the setup (Tsetup) and hold (Thold) times
respectively. The data shall not arrive too late nor too early.
This arrival constraints can be described mathematically with
two timing constraint equations: the setup time timing con-
straint expressed in eq. 1 and the hold time timing constraint
expressed in eq. 2 [7].
Tclk > Dclk2q +DpMax + Tsetup − Tskew (1)
Thold < Dclk2q +DpMin + Tskew (2)
where Tskew is the slight phase difference that may exist
between the clock signals at the clock inputs of two different
registers due to the clock propagation times through the clock
network, and DpMin is the minimal propagation time through
the logic.
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Fig. 2. Critical paths of the AES’ rounds when subject to: (a) underpowering, (b) a negative power supply glitch, (c) overpowering.
B. Fault injection due to timing constraints violations
The violation of these timing constraints is a means to inject
faults into synchronous integrated circuits (IC).
Previous studies have shown how underpowering a syn-
chronous circuit leads to setup time violations [1], [2], [8]. As
the target’s supply voltage is decreased, the propagation times
through its logic are increased. Consequently, a violation of
the setup time constraint may happen when the propagation
time increase is large enough: thus a fault is induced. Fig.
2(a) illustrates the effect of underpowering an IC implementing
the AES algorithm (its nominal voltage and clock period are
1.2V and 10ns respectively). The critical times of the AES’
rounds at nominal voltage are depicted in white on the upper
curve (they are obviously shorter than the clock period in
order to comply with the setup time constraint). The bottom
curve represents the decrease of the target’s core voltage (i.e.
the underpowering). As a result, the critical times of the
whole AES’ rounds are increased (depicted in grey). In this
illustration a setup time violation occurs during the 9th round.
Fig. 2(b) illustrates the effect of a negative power supply
glitch: the critical time of the round centered on the glitch (and
also those of its neighbors rounds) is increased. As a result, the
setup time violation occurs during the 6th round. This allows
an attacker to target a given round, which is mandatory to
perform a successful differential fault attack [9].
Fig. 2(c) illustrates the effect of an increase of the tar-
get’s core voltage (i.e. overpowering): its critical times are
decreased (depicted with grey stripes). No faults were ob-
tained because there were neither setup time nor hold time
violations (for the latter, the rounds’ propagation times are
too large). Note that the illustrations of Fig. 2 are based on
actual experiments. We were not able to inject faults into the
AES’ computations by overpowering. However, faults may be
injected in the parts an IC which has very small propagation
times: e.g. a shift register.
Nevertheless, we have successfully injected faults into the
AES’ computations using positive power supply glitches. Ac-
cording to the previous examples, the related FI mechanism
seemed unlikely to be due to setup or hold time violations. It
was the main motivation of our work: sensing the core voltage
of an IC when exposed to voltage glitches in order to find out
the relevant FI mechanism.
III. VOLTMETER DESIGN
Previous experiments [2] on the IC used to carry out the
experimental part of this paper showed that the propagation
times of the IC logic vary linearly with its power supply
voltage. Consequently, measuring the delay of a logic block
reveals its supply voltage value. Thus, for the purpose of
monitoring the core voltage of an IC exposed to power glitches,
we designed a delay-meter (the so-called voltmeter). Note that
this technique has already been introduced and validated by
K. Zick et al. [4].
Fig. 3 shows the simplified architecture of the delay-meter.
It is made out of two blocks:
• a delay block for which the delay depends on the IC’s
core voltage,
• a time-to-digital converter (TDC [10]) used to obtain a
binary code correlated with the delay.
The input of the delay-meter is the clock signal of the device
(clk). It is fed into the delay block to produce a delayed clock,
clkdelay(0). The corresponding delay, delay(V dd), depends on
its supply voltage V dd. Then, the TDC is used to convert the
phase difference between clk and clkdelay(0) into a binary
code. The TDC consists of a series of 8 delay elements (their el-
ementary delay is δd). Its input is the delayed clock clkdelay(0).
Thus, it provides 8 delayed clocks with an additional delay:
n∗δd, where n is the index of the corresponding delay element.
Then, 8 DFFs are used to compare the phases of the delayed
clocks with the main clock clk. The output of the nth DFF is
low, resp. high, when clkdelay(n) is in phase advance, resp. in
phase delay, with respect to clk. As a result, the outputs of the
DFFs form an 8-bit vector, which depends on delay(V dd) ([4],
[10]). The right-hand side of Fig. 3 illustrates the obtained
output vectors for different settings of the core voltage. As
V dd varies, the phase shift between the clock signals also
varies leading to a change in the TDC’s output vector. The
obtained binary code is a thermometer code: it consists in 2
blocks of consecutive ”0” and ”1”. The information it contains
is twofold:
• its Hamming Weight (HW),
• the order of these blocks to differentiate e.g. ”000111”
and ”111000”.
Thus, to take into account both these pieces of information,
we used the notion of Signed Hamming Weight (SHW): e.g.
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Fig. 3. Simplified architecture of the delay-meter (i.e. voltmeter).
”00000111” and ”11100000” were respectively denoted ”+3”
and ”-3” (see also Fig. 3).
We used 4 instances of the previous delay-meter (with
different delay blocks) to build a voltmeter with a proper
voltage measurement range and resolution: 0.7V to 2.4V and
around 20mV respectively. Note that the voltage resolution
was not constant over the whole measurement range. Fig. 4
displays its SHW output as a function of the core voltage. The
device embedding the voltmeter was exposed to static voltage
underpowering to gather the measures used to build this curve.
The bijective function corresponding to this curve was used
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Fig. 4. TDC outputs vs. core voltage.
hereafter to convert the output vectors of the voltmeter into
a voltage; despite the fact that the corresponding experiments
were carried out with dynamic perturbations (i.e. glitches).
IV. EXPERIMENTAL SETUP
In this study we used two different setups, a voltmeter
and an AES, embedded alternately in the same test vehicle:
a programmable circuit (FPGA - Xilinx Spartan3 700A).
A. Pulse generator
We used an Agilent 8114A pulse generator to inject power
supply glitches into our test vehicle. This pulse generator is
able to produce positive or negative voltage pulses in the 1V to
50V range, with constant fall and rise times equal to 10ns and
a tunable pulse width between 10ns and 100ms. The voltage
pulse is centered on a tunable DC voltage. We used this feature
to provide the voltage supply of the test chip and also to set
and modify at will its value.
B. Voltmeter setup
This subsection presents the first FPGA setup used to sense
its core voltage when exposed to power supply glitches. The
voltmeter introduced in section III is well suited to measure a
static voltage. Its output is updated at the rate of its clock
signal. Its period is 5ns. In order to monitor a transient
perturbation (i.e. a voltage glitch), a 30 stage shift register
(SR) with an 8-bit width was connected to its output. It makes
it possible to register the core voltage over a 150ns range with
a 5ns time resolution (it was not feasible to further increase the
length of the SR because of design and practical constraints).
Because the FPGA and the pulse generator were synchro-
nized thanks to a common trigger signal, we were able to
extend this time window by carrying out the measurements
at different times for identical settings (i.e. the voltage pulse
parameters). The measurements were carried out over a global
time range of 750ns by dividing it in time slots of 150ns.
Moreover, during each time slot the experiments were repro-
duced 5 times with a successive time increment of 1ns. Hence,
the time resolution was upgraded to 1ns. In addition, all these
measurements were conducted three times and then averaged.
Note also that, many of the voltage glitch injection experi-
ments were performed with a core voltage set over the FPGA
nominal voltage of 1.2V. In order to center the glitch within
the voltmeter’s best achievable resolution range and thus to
obtain accurate measurements (this was the case for the curves
displayed in section V).
C. Fault injection setup
This subsection presents the second FPGA setup used to in-
ject faults and verify our assumptions about the fault injection
mechanisms. The target is a hardware 128-bit AES designed
to operate at a 10ns clock period and to complete a whole
encryption in 11 clock cycles. In this work, the 128-bit AES
([6]) is mainly used as a test element. Thus, we will not go
deeper into its properties. However, because this algorithm is
likely to be subject to FA, the obtained results are still of
interest.
We used the following methodology to induce faults into
the AES’ calculations: we kept constant the pulse amplitude
(either positive or negative) and width settings while varying
both the core voltage provided by the pulse generator to the
test chip and the starting time of the pulse. At first, the core
voltage was set over its nominal voltage and then progressively
decreased until a first fault was induced. The starting time of
the pulse was also swept along a time range encompassing
the whole AES in order to target all its rounds. Then, other
pulse amplitude and width settings were tested according to
the same methodology.
V. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
First, we performed both negative and positive power supply
glitches with a pulse width varying from 10ns to 500ns and
an amplitude varying from 1V to 50V. During these injections
the core voltage of the FPGA was observed with the on-chip
voltmeter. Then, these obtained waveforms were analyzed and
an assumption about the fault injection mechanism related to
positive power supply glitches was made. Second, we verified
this assumption by targeting an AES with relevant positive and
negative power supply glitches.
A. Negative power supply glitch effects on the core voltage
1) Observations: The first injection experiments with neg-
ative voltage glitches were carried out on the voltmeter. We
observed two sets of damping oscillations corresponding to the
falling and rising edges of the injected voltage pulse. As an
example, Fig. 5 displays the FPGA core voltage (measured with
the on-chip voltmeter) for a voltage pulse of -14V amplitude
and 400ns duration. The time interval between the 2 sets of
damping oscillations is 400ns, which is also the time interval
between the falling and rising edges of the power glitch. The
first negative oscillation after the perturbation’s falling edge is
the biggest: its amplitude is close to 400mV and its width at
the oscillation’s tip is around 20ns. Similar shapes for the core
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Fig. 5. Core voltage of the FPGA for a (400ns , -14V) power supply glitch.
voltage were measured for other settings of the pulse’s param-
eters. Analyzing the obtained core voltage shapes, we drew
the assumption that the first negative oscillation following the
pulse’s falling edge was well suited to induce faults into an
IC: it might be used according to the principle depicted in Fig.
2(b). Fault injection is a result of setup time violations induced
by a transient underpowering of the target corresponding to the
oscillation width.
2) Fault injection: Consequently, the 2nd set of experi-
ments was performed on the AES setup (see subsection IV-C)
with a (400ns, -14V) pulse. The moment of the negative
oscillation’s tip was swept over the AES’ rounds. Moreover,
for each time location, the DC component of the glitch was
gradually decreased from 1.7V until the injection of the first
faults. As a result, the voltage of the oscillation tip went
under the target’s nominal voltage (1.2V) inducing a setup
time violation.
This methodology made it possible to inject faults into every
AES round (except the first one). We also verified that the
faulted rounds always corresponded with the time location of
the oscillation tip. Most of the induced faults were single-bit
faults affecting only one round. For the sake of brevity, these
results are not detailed here. However, subsection V-C4 reports
very similar results.
B. Positive power supply glitch effects on the core voltage
1) Observations: Fig. 6 displays the FPGA’s core voltage
measured with the voltmeter when exposed to a positive power
supply glitch. Its duration and amplitude were 400ns and +14V
respectively. The induced core voltage perturbation is very
similar to that induced by a negative voltage pulse (see Fig.
5), except that the damping oscillation sets corresponding to
the falling and rising edges are inverted. Similar shapes were
obtained with close settings of the voltage pulse. The main
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Fig. 6. Core voltage of the FPGA for a (400ns , +14V) power supply glitch.
result of these experiments is that a positive power supply
glitch induces negative transient voltage modifications under
its DC component. For the experiment reported in Fig. 6, the
second oscillation (corresponding to the rising edge of the
pulse) has a voltage at its tip end which is 300mV under its
DC component. Moreover, this transient underpowering has a
duration around 20ns at its tip, which seems well suited to
target the rounds of our AES setup.
From the observation of Fig. 6, we drew the counter-
intuitive assumption that a positive power supply glitch may
create setup time constraint violations because of the induced
negative oscillations. The following experiments were meant
to ascertain this assumption.
2) Fault injection: Fault injection experiments with a posi-
tive power supply glitch (400ns, +14V) were then carried out
on the AES setup. The injection time of the voltage pulse
was varied in order to sweep the whole AES’ rounds with
the tip of the second oscillation which is negative. For each
time location, the DC component of the glitch was gradually
decreased from 1.7V until the injection of the first faults.
Following this methodology we succeeded in injecting faults
into the various rounds of the AES’ calculations. For a given
dataset (i.e. the plaintext and key used for the AES encryption),
the injected faults were equal to the faults induced with
negative power supply glitches. Moreover, the faulted rounds
always corresponded to the time location of the negative
oscillation tip end. This is an experimental proof that the faults
injected with positive power supply glitches are due to setup
time violations created by the negative oscillations induced by
the voltage pulse edges.
C. Further results
According to the previous experiments the pulse width value
had no significant effect on the induced voltage perturbations.
The main parameters influencing fault injection were the
pulse amplitude and DC component values. However, with
proper width settings, the oscillation sets will overlap creating
offsetting, addition, or sharping effects which may facilitate
FI.
1) Offsetting: For a negative voltage pulse with a width
equal to the period of the damping oscillation sets, an off-
setting effect arises. It consists in offsetting the 2nd negative
oscillation induced by the falling edge of the pulse with the
1st positive oscillation of its rising edge. Offsetting allows us
to avoid injecting extra faults during the erased oscillation.
Fig. 7(a) displays the obtained core voltage perturbations for
a (100ns, -14V) pulse.
2) Addition: The addition effect of a (50ns, +8V) positive
voltage glitch is given in Fig. 7(b), where the 50ns width
corresponds to the oscillations half-period. As a result, the
amplitude of the 1st negative oscillation is increased by
addition of the 1st negative oscillation of the 2nd set: a 400mV
amplitude is obtained for an 8V pulse amplitude whereas a
14V amplitude was required without an addition effect (see
Fig. 7(a)).
3) Sharping: Fig. 7(c) illustrates the sharping effect for
a (10ns, -22V) pulse. It consists in a partial overlap of the
1st oscillation induced by the glitch falling and rising edges
in order to thin down the faulting negative oscillation. The
sharping effect increases the resolution of FI at the expense
of its amplitude: the width of the oscillation tip end is
decreased to approximately 10ns, while an increase of the
pulse amplitude to 22V was required to obtain an oscillation
amplitude of 400mV (as obtained in Fig. 7(a) and 7(b) for
pulse amplitude of 14V and 8V resp.).
4) Fault injection: The (100ns, -14V), (50ns, +8V) and
(10ns, -22V) pulses used to illustrate the offsetting, addition
and sharping effects were then applied to the AES setup
for FI characterization (the same data were used during the
following experiments). All AES’ rounds were targeted by
sweeping the time of the negative oscillation tip end over a
large time window. For each time step, an increasing stress
was applied to successive encryptions by decreasing step by
step the DC component of the voltage glitch from 1.7V until
a first fault appears. It made it possible to draw a time map of
the fault sensitivity threshold of the AES rounds as displayed
in Fig. 8(a), 8(b) and 8(c) (the fault sensitivity threshold
is expressed as the pulse voltage DC component maximal
value inducing faults). The obtained voltage sensitivity shapes
are very similar, which was expected because the faulting
oscillations have a same oscillation amplitude of 400mV. They
differ in time because their respective oscillation tips have
different timing w.r.t. the synchronization signal.
The sharped oscillation of Fig. 7(a) achieved the best time
resolution: single-bit faults were injected into the whole AES’
rounds (except the 1st one). Whereas the broader negative os-
cillations induces by the (100ns, -14V) and (50ns, +8V) pulses
did not succeed in faulting the 6th round (the time sensitivity
windows of the 5th and 7th rounds were accordingly expanded
as depicted in Fig.8(a) and 8(b)).
During these three sets of experiments the faults injected
in the same AES round were identical. This proves again that
the FI mechanism related to both negative and positive power
supply glitches is the same.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper we presented an on-chip delay-based volt-
meter. This voltmeter was used to monitor the FPGA core
voltage when exposed to power supply glitches. It revealed
the induction of two damping oscillation sets inside the target
corresponding to the falling and rising edges of the voltage
glitch. It also permits us to correlate FI with the tip ends
of negative oscillations. Moreover, because the faults injected
with negative and positive voltage glitches were identical (and
because the FI mechanism of negative voltage glitches was
already established to be linked to setup time violations), it
demonstrates on a practical basis that the FI mechanism of
positive voltage glitches is related to setup time violations.
Various techniques of glitch shaping were also introduced that
may enhance the efficiency of FI. Designers of secure devices
shall be aware that such voltage glitches make it possible to
inject single-bit faults with very good timing accuracy.
One interesting consequence of this finding, is that the
counter-measures designed to thwart negative power supply
glitches should also be effective to defeat FI attempts with
positive supply glitches. This will be investigated through
further research work.
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Fig. 8. Faulted AES’ rounds for various pulse DC component and time settings.
[3] M. Hutter, J.-M. Schmidt, and T. Plos, “Contact-based fault injections
and power analysis on rfid tags,” in Circuit Theory and Design, 2009.
ECCTD 2009. European Conference on. IEEE, 2009, pp. 409–412.
[4] K. M. Zick, M. Srivastav, W. Zhang, and M. French, “Sensing
nanosecond-scale voltage attacks and natural transients in fpgas,” in
Proceedings of the ACM/SIGDA international symposium on Field
programmable gate arrays. ACM, 2013, pp. 101–104.
[5] K. A. Bowman, C. Tokunaga, J. W. Tschanz, A. Raychowdhury, M. M.
Khellah, B. M. Geuskens, S.-L. Lu, P. A. Aseron, T. Karnik, and V. K.
De, “All-digital circuit-level dynamic variation monitor for silicon debug
and adaptive clock control,” Circuits and Systems I: Regular Papers,
IEEE Transactions on, vol. 58, no. 9, pp. 2017–2025, 2011.
[6] NIST, “Announcing the advanced encryption standard (aes),” Federal
Information Processing Standards Publication 197, 2001.
[7] J. M. Rabaey, A. Chandrakasan, and B. Nikolic, Digital Integrated
Circuits. Prentice Hall, 2003.
[8] A. Barenghi, G. Bertoni, L. Breveglieri, M. Pellicioli, and G. Pelosi,
“Low voltage fault attacks to aes,” in HOST, 2010, pp. 7–12.
[9] A. Barenghi, L. Breveglieri, I. Koren, and D. Naccache, “Fault injection
attacks on cryptographic devices: Theory, practice, and countermea-
sures.” in Proceedings of the IEEE, 2012.
[10] P. Dudek, S. Szczepanski, and J. V. Hatfield, “A high-resolution cmos
time-to-digital converter utilizing a vernier delay line,” Solid-State
Circuits, IEEE Journal of, vol. 35, no. 2, pp. 240–247, 2000.
